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Abstract
Many set selection and ranking algorithms have re-
cently been enhanced with diversity constraints that
aim to explicitly increase representation of histori-
cally disadvantaged populations, or to improve the
overall representativeness of the selected set. An
unintended consequence of these constraints, how-
ever, is reduced in-group fairness: the selected can-
didates from a given group may not be the best
ones, and this unfairness may not be well-balanced
across groups. In this paper we study this phe-
nomenon using datasets that comprise multiple sen-
sitive attributes. We then introduce additional con-
straints, aimed at balancing the in-group fairness
across groups, and formalize the induced optimiza-
tion problems as integer linear programs. Using
these programs, we conduct an experimental eval-
uation with real datasets, and quantify the feasi-
ble trade-offs between balance and overall perfor-
mance in the presence of diversity constraints.
1 Introduction
The desire for diversity and fairness in many contexts, rang-
ing from results of a Web search to admissions at a univer-
sity, has recently introduced the need to revisit algorithm de-
sign in these settings. Prominent examples include set selec-
tion and ranking algorithms, which have recently been en-
hanced with diversity constraints [Celis et al., 2018; Drosou
et al., 2017; Stoyanovich et al., 2018; Zehlike et al., 2017;
Zliobaite, 2017]. Such constraints focus on groups of items
in the input that satisfy a given sensitive attribute label, typi-
cally denoting membership in a demographic group, and seek
to ensure that these groups are appropriately represented in
the selected set or ranking. Notably, each item will often be
associated with multiple attribute labels (e.g., an individual
may be both female and Asian).
Diversity constraints may be imposed for legal reasons,
such as for compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 [(EEOC), 2019]. Beyond legal requirements, benefits
of diversity, both to small groups and to society as a whole,
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are increasingly recognized by sociologists and political sci-
entists [Page, 2008; Surowiecki, 2005]. Last but not least,
diversity constraints can be used to ensure dataset represen-
tativeness, for example when selecting a group of patients to
study the effectiveness of a medical treatment, or to under-
stand the patterns of use of medical services [Cohen et al.,
2009], an example we will revisit in this paper.
Our goal in this paper is to evaluate and mitigate an unin-
tended consequence that such diversity constraints may have
on the outcomes of set selection and ranking algorithms.
Namely, we want to ensure that these algorithms do not sys-
tematically select lower-quality items in particular groups. In
what follows, we make our set-up more precise.
Given a set of items, each associated with multiple sen-
sitive attribute labels and with a quality score (or utility), a
set selection algorithm needs to select k of these items aim-
ing to maximize the overall utility, computed as the sum of
utility scores of selected items. The score of an item is a
single scalar that may be pre-computed and stored as a phys-
ical attribute, or it may be computed on the fly. The output
of traditional set selection algorithms, however, may lead to
an underrepresentation of items with a specific sensitive at-
tribute. As a result, recent work has aimed to modify these
algorithms with the goal of introducing diversity.
There are numerous ways to define diversity. For set selec-
tion, a unifying formulation for a rich class of proportional
representation fairness [Zliobaite, 2017] and coverage-based
diversity [Drosou et al., 2017] measures is to specify a lower
bound `v for each sensitive attribute value v, and to enforce it
as the minimum cardinality of items satisfying v in the output
[Stoyanovich et al., 2018]. If the k selected candidates need
to also be ranked in the output, this formulation can be ex-
tended to specify a lower bound `v,p for every attribute v and
every prefix p of the returned ranked list, with p ď k [Celis et
al., 2018]. Then, at least `v,p items satisfying v should appear
in the top p positions of the output. We refer to all of these
as diversity constraints in the remainder of this paper. Given
a set of diversity constraints, one can then seek to maximize
the utility of the selected set, subject to these constraints.
As expected, enforcing diversity constraints often comes at
a price in terms of overall utility. Furthermore, the following
simple example exhibits that, when faced with a combination
of diversity constraints, maximizing utility subject to these
constraints can lead to another form of imbalance.
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Male Female
White A (99) B (98) C (96) D (95)
Black E (91) F (91) G (90) H (89)
Asian I (87) J (87) K (86) L (83)
Table 1: A set of 12 individuals with sensitive attributes race and
gender. Each cell lists an individual’s ID, and score in parentheses.
Example 1 Consider 12 candidates who are applying for
k “ 4 committee positions. Table 1 illustrates this example
using a letter from A to L as the candidate ID and specifying
the ethnicity, gender, and score of each candidate (e.g., can-
didate E is a Black male with a score of 91). Suppose that the
following diversity constraints are imposed: the committee
should include two male and two female candidates, and at
least one candidate from each race. In this example both race
and gender are strongly correlated with the score: White can-
didates have the highest scores, followed by Black and then
by Asian. Further, male candidates of each race have higher
scores than female candidates of the same race.
The committee that maximizes utility while satisfying the
diversity constraints is tA, B, G, Ku, with utility score 373.
Note that this outcome fails to select the highest-scoring fe-
male candidates (C and D), as well as the highest-scoring
Black (E and F) and Asian (I and J) candidates. This is in
contrast to the fact that it selects the best male and the best
White candidates (A and B). This type of “unfairness” is un-
avoidable due to the diversity constraints, but in this outcome
it hurts historically disadvantaged groups (e.g., females and
Black candidates) more. However, one can still try to dis-
tribute this unfairness in a more “balanced” way across dif-
ferent sensitive attribute values. For instance, an alternative
committee selection could be tA, C, E, Ku, with utility 372.
For only a small drop in utility, this ensures that the top fe-
male, male, White, and Black candidates are selected.
Example 1 illustrates that diversity constraints may in-
evitably lead to unfairness within groups of candidates. An
important concern is that, unless appropriately managed, this
unfairness may disproportionately affect demographic groups
with lower scores. This is particularly problematic when
lower scores are the result of historical disadvantage, as may,
for example, be the case in standardized testing [Brunn-Bevel
and Byrd, 2015]. In this paper, we focus on this phenomenon
and our goal is to provide measures for quantifying fairness
in this context, to which we refer as in-group fairness, and to
study the extent to which its impact can be balanced across
groups rather than disproportionately affect a few groups.
Contributions We make the following contributions:
• We observe that diversity constraints can impact in-
group fairness, and introduce two novel measures that
quantify this impact.
• We observe that the extent to which in-group fairness
is violated in datasets with multiple sensitive attributes
may be quite different for different attribute values.
• We translate each of our in-group fairness measures into
a set of constraints for an integer linear program.
Organization. After providing the required definitions and
notation in Section 2, we introduce our notions of in-group
fairness in Section 3. We translate in-group fairness into con-
straints for an integer linear program in Section 4, and use the
leximin criterion to select the best feasible parameters. We
present experiments on real datsets in Section 5, discuss re-
lated work in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
Both the set selection and the ranking problem are defined
given a set I of n items (or candidates), along with a score
si associated with each item i P I; this score summarizes the
qualifications or the relevance of each item. The goal of the
set selection problem is to choose a subset A Ď I of k ! n
of these items aiming to maximize the total score
ř
iPA si.
The ranking problem, apart from selecting the items, also re-
quires that the items are ranked — assigned to distinct posi-
tions 1, 2, . . . , k. In this paper we study the impact of diver-
sity constraints that may be enforced on the outcome.
Each item is labeled based on a set Y of sensitive attributes.
For instance, if the items correspond to job candidates, the
sensitive attributes could be “race”, “gender”, or “national-
ity”. Each attribute y P Y may take one of a predefined
set (or domain) of values, or labels, Ly; for the attribute
“gender”, the set of values would include “male” and “fe-
male”. We refer to attributes that have only two values (e.g.,
the values tmale, femaleu for “gender”) as binary. We use
L “ ŤyPY Ly to denote the set of all the attribute values
related to attributes in the set Y . (To simplify notation, we
assume that domains of attribute values do not overlap.)
Given a sensitive attribute value v P L, we let Iv Ď I
denote the set of items that satisfy this label. For instance, if
v corresponds to the label “female”, then Iv is the set of all
female candidates. We refer to such a set Iv as a group (e.g.,
the group of female candidates). For each attribute value v
and item i P Iv , we let Ii,v “ tj P Iv : sj ě siu be the
set of items with attribute value v that have a score greater
than or equal to si (including i); for simplicity, and without
loss of generality, we assume that no two scores are exactly
equal. In Example 1 if we let v correspond to the attribute
value “Black” and let i be candidate G, then Ii,v “ tE, F, Gu
and Si,v “ 272. We also use smax “ maxiPItsiu and smin “
miniPItsiu to denote the maximum and minimum scores over
all available items. Let λ “ smax{smin be the ratio of the
maximum over the minimum score.
For a given selection, A, of k items, we use Av Ď Iv to
denote the subset of items in Iv that are inA, andBv Ď Iv for
those that are not. Also, av “ miniPAvtsiu is the lowest score
among the ones that were accepted and bv “ maxiPBvtsiu
the highest score among the items in Iv that were rejected. We
say that a set selection of k items is in-group fair with respect
to v if bv ď av , i.e., no rejected candidate in Iv is better than
an accepted one. In Section 3 we define two measures for
quantifying how in-group fair a solution is. Finally, we use
Ai,v “ Av X Ii,v to denote the set of selected items in Iv
whose score is at least si for some i P Av .
3 Diversity and In-Group Fairness
To ensure proportional representation of groups in algorith-
mic outcomes, one way of introducing diversity constraints is
to specify lower bounds for each group Iv . Using diversity
constraints, one may require, for example, that the propor-
tion of females in a selected set or in the top-p positions of
a ranking, for some p ď k, closely approximates the propor-
tion of females in the overall population. Depending on the
notion of appropriate representation, one can then define, for
each sensitive attribute value (or label) v and each position p,
a lower bound `v,p on the number of items satisfying value
v that appear in the top-p positions of the final ranking (see,
e.g., [Celis et al., 2018]). Given such bounds, one can then
seek to maximize the overall utility of the generated set or
ranking. The main drawback of this approach is that it may
come at the expense of in-group fairness, described next.
Given some label v and the group of items Iv that satisfy
this label, in-group fairness requires that if kv items from Iv
appear in the outcome, then it should be the best kv items
of Iv . Note that, were it not for diversity constraints, any
utility maximizing outcome would achieve in-group fairness:
excluding some candidate in favor of someone with a lower
score would clearly lead to a sub-optimal outcome. However,
as we verified in Example 1, in the presence of diversity con-
straints, maintaining in-group fairness for all groups may be
impossible. In this paper we propose and study two measures
of approximate in-group fairness, which we now define.
IGF-Ratio Given an outcome A, a direct and intuitive way
to quantify in-group fairness for some group Iv is to consider
the unfairness in the treatment of the most qualified candidate
in Iv that was non included in A. Specifically, we use the
ratio between the minimum score of an item inAv (the lowest
accepted score) over the maximum score in Bv (the highest
rejected score). This provides a fairness measure with values
in the range r0, 1s and higher values implying more in-group
fairness. For instance, if some highly qualified candidate in
Iv with score s was rejected in favor of another candidate in
Iv with score s{2, then the ratio is 1{2.
IGF-Ratiopvq “ av
bv
(1)
IGF-Aggregated Our second measure of in-group fair-
ness aims to ensure that for every selected item i P Av the
score
ř
hPAi,v sh is a good approximation of
ř
hPIi,v sh. The
first sum corresponds to aggregate utility of all accepted items
h P Iv with sh ě si, and the second sum is the aggregate
utility of all items (both accepted and rejected) h P Iv with
sh ě si. If no qualified candidate in Iv is rejected in favor
of some less qualified one, then these sums are equal. On the
other hand, the larger the fraction of high-scoring candidates
rejected in favor of lower-scoring ones, the wider the gap be-
tween these sums. For a given group Iv , our second in-group
fairness measure is the worst-case ratio (over all i P Av) of
the former sum divided by the latter. Just like our first mea-
sure, this leads to a number in the range r0, 1s, with greater
values indicating more in-group fairness.
IGF-Aggregatedpvq “ min
iPAv
#ř
hPAi,v shř
hPIi,v sh
+
(2)
4 Balancing In-Group Fairness
As our experiments in Section 5 show, the distribution of in-
group fairness across groups can be quite imbalanced in the
presence of diversity constraints. In order to mitigate this is-
sue, we now introduce additional constraints that aim to better
distribute in-group fairness across groups. We begin by show-
ing that the problem of maximizing the total utility subject to
a combination of diversity and in-group fairness constraints
can be formulated as an integer linear program.
It is worth noting that even the much simpler problem of
checking the feasibility of a given set of diversity constraints
(let alone maximizing total utility and introducing additional
in-group fairness constraints) is NP-hard (see Theorem 3.5 in
[Celis et al., 2018]). Therefore, we cannot not expect to solve
our optimization problems in polynomial time. In light of this
intractability, we instead formulate our optimization prob-
lems as integer programs. Although solving these programs
can require exponential time in the worst case, standard inte-
ger programming libraries allow us to solve reasonably large
instances in a very small amount of time. We briefly discuss
the computational demands of these programs in Sec. 5.
4.1 Integer Program Formulations
The integer programs receive as input, for each v P L and
p P rks, a set of `v,p values, and for each v P L, a qv
value, which correspond to diversity and in-group fairness
lower bounds, respectively. The output of the program is a
utility-maximizing ranking of k items such that at least `v,p
items from Iv are in the top p positions, and the in-group fair-
ness of each v P L is at least qv . For each item i P I and
each position p P rks of the ranking, the integer program uses
an indicator variable xi,p that is set either to 1, indicating that
item i is in position p of the ranked output, or to 0, indicating
that it is not. We also use variable xi “ řpPrks xi,p that is
set to 1 if i is included in any position of the output, and to 0
otherwise. The program below is for the IGF-Ratio measure.
maximize:
ÿ
iPI
xisi
subject to: xi “
ÿ
pPrks
xi,p, @i P Iÿ
iPI
xi,p ď 1, @p P rksÿ
iPIv
ÿ
qPrps
xi,q ě `v,p, @v P L,@p P rks
av ď pλ´ pλ´ 1q ¨ xiqsi, @v P L,@i P Iv
bv ě p1´ xiqsi, @v P L,@i P Iv
av ě qvbv, @v P L
av, bv P rsmin, smaxs, @v P L
xi, xi,p P t0, 1u, @i P I,@p P rks
The first set of inequalities ensures that at most one item
is selected for each position. The second set of inequalities
corresponds to the diversity constraints: for each attribute
value v and position p, include at least `v,p items from Iv
among the top p positions of the output. Most of the remain-
ing constraints then aim to guarantee that every group Iv has
an IGF-Ratio of at least qv . Among these constraints, the
most interesting one is av ď pλ ´ pλ ´ 1q ¨ xiqsi. This is a
linear constraint, since both λ “ smax{smin and si are con-
stants. Note that, if xi is set to be equal to 1, i.e., if item
i P I is accepted, then this constraint becomes av ď si and
hence ensures that av can be no more than the score of any
accepted item. Yet, if xi is set to be equal to 0, i.e., if item i
is rejected, then this becomes av ď λsi “ smax sismin ď smax,
and hence this constraint does not restrict the possible val-
ues of av . Therefore, av is guaranteed to be no more than
the smallest accepted score in Iv and bv is at least as large
as the smallest rejected score, since bv ě p1 ´ xiqsi, and
hence bv ě si if xi “ 0. As a result, av ě qvbv enforces the
IGF-Ratio constraint avbv ě qv .
In order to get the integer linear program that enforces IGF-
Aggregated constraints, we modify the program above by
replacing all the constraints that involve av or bv with the set
of constraints
ř
hPIiv xhsh ě qvxi
ř
hPIiv sh for all v P L
and all i P Iv . Note that for i with xi “ 0 this constraint
becomes trivially satisfied, since the right hand side becomes
0 and the left hand side is always positive. If, on the other
hand, xi “ 1, then this inequality ensures that, for all i P Av:ř
hPIi,v xhshř
hPIi,v sh
ě qv ñ
ř
hPAi,v shř
hPIi,v sh
ě qv.
4.2 The Leximin Solution
Equipped with the ability to compute the utility-maximizing
outcome in the presence of both in-group fairness and diver-
sity constraints, our next step is to use these integer linear pro-
grams to optimize the balance of in-group fairness across dif-
ferent groups. In fact, this gives rise to a non-trivial instance
of a fair division problem: given one of the in-group fairness
measures that we have defined, for each possible outcome,
this measure quantifies how “happy” each group should be,
implying a form of “group happiness”. Therefore, each out-
come yields a vector q “ pq1, q2, . . . , q|L|q of in-group fair-
ness values for each group. As we have seen, achieving an
in-group fairness vector of q “ p1, 1, . . . , 1q may be infeasi-
ble due to the diversity constraints. Given the setQ of feasible
vectors q implied by the diversity constraints, our goal is to
identify an outcome (i.e., an in-group fairness vector q) that
fairly distributes in-group fairness values across all groups.
From this perspective, our problem can be thought of as a
fair division problem where the goods being allocated are the
k slots in the set, and the fairness of the outcome towards all
possible groups is evaluated based on the in-group fairness
vector q that it induces. Fair division is receiving significant
attention in economics (e.g., [Moulin, 2004]) and recently
also in computer science (e.g., [Brandt et al., 2016, Part II]).
A common solution that this literature provides to the ques-
tion of how happiness should be distributed is maximin. Over
all feasible in-group fairness vectors q P Q, the maximin so-
lution dictates that a fair solution should maximize the min-
imum happiness, so it outputs argmaxqPQtminvPL qvu. In
this paper we consider a well-studied refinement of this ap-
proach, known as the leximin solution [Moulin, 2004, Sec.
3.3]. Since there may be multiple vectors q with the same
minimum happiness guarantee, minvPL qv , the leximin solu-
tion chooses among them one that also maximizes the sec-
ond smallest happiness value. In case of ties, this process is
repeated for the third smallest happiness, and so on, until a
unique vector is identified. More generally, if the elements of
each feasible vector q P Q are sorted in non-decreasing or-
der, then the leximin solution is the vector that is greater than
all others from a lexicographic order standpoint.
Given the vector q of in-group fairness values that corre-
spond to the leximin solution, we can just run one of the inte-
ger linear programs defined above to get the balanced set, but
how do we compute this leximin vector q? A simple way to
achieve this is to use binary search in order to first identify the
set of maximin solutions. For each value of q P r0, 1s we can
check the feasibility of the integer linear program if we use
that same q value for all the groups. Starting from q “ 0.5,
if the solution is feasible we update the value to q “ 0.75,
whereas if it is infeasible we update it to q “ 0.25, and repeat
recursively. Once the largest value of q that can be guaranteed
for all groups has been identified, we check which group Iv it
is for which this constraint is binding, we fix qv “ q, and con-
tinue similarly for the remaining groups, aiming to maximize
the second smallest in-group fairness value, and so on.
In the experiments of the following section, we compute
the leximin solution on real datasets and evaluate its in-group
fairness and utility.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we describe the results of an experimental
evaluation with three empirical goals: (1) to understand the
conditions that lead to reduced in-group fairness; (2) to as-
certain the feasibility of mitigating the observed imbalance
with the help of in-group fairness constraints; (3) to explore
the trade-offs between in-group fairness and utility.
5.1 Datasets
Our experimental evaluation was conducted on the following
two real datasets:
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) is a compre-
hensive source of individual and household-level information
regarding the amount of health expenditures by individuals
from various demographic or socioeconomic groups [Cohen
et al., 2009; Coston et al., 2019]. MEPS is ideal for our
purposes as it includes sensitive attributes such as race and
age group for each individual. Each candidate’s score corre-
sponds to the utilization feature, defined in the IBM AI
Fairness 360 toolkit [Bellamy et al., 2018] as the total num-
ber of trips requiring medical care, and computed as the sum
of the number of office-based visits, the number of outpatient
visits, the number of ER visits, the number of inpatient nights,
and the number of home health visits.
High-utilization respondents (with utilization ě 10)
constitute around 17% of the dataset. MEPS includes sur-
vey data of more than 10,000 individuals. We use data from
Panel 20 of calendar year 2016, and select the top 5,110
individuals with utilization ą 5 as our experimental
dataset. We focus on two categorical attributes: race (with
(a) Diversity constraints only (b) Adding balance constraints (c) Diversity constraints only (d) Adding balance constraints
Figure 1: In-group fairness for groups defined by race and age in the MEPS dataset with 5, 110 items, selecting top-k candidates as a
ranked list, with diversity constraints on each of the 8 possible race groups and 2 age groups.
(a) Diversity constraints only (b) Adding balance constraints (c) Diversity constraints only (d) Adding balance constraints
Figure 2: In-group fairness for groups defined by department size and area in the CS dataset with 51 items, selecting top-k candidates
as a ranked list, with diversity constraints on each of the 2 possible size groups and 5 area groups.
(a) Distribution of utilization score in MEPS dataset (b) Distribution of publication count in CS dataset
Figure 3: Score distribution for groups in MEPS and CS dataset.
values “White”, “Black”, “Multiple races”, “Native Hawai-
ian”, “Asian Indian”, “Filipino”, “Chinese”, and “American
Indian”) and age (“Middle” and “Young”).
CS department rankings (CS) contains information about
51 computer science departments in the US [Berger, 2018].
We use publication count as the scoring attribute and
select two categorical attributes: department size (with
values “large” and “small”) and area (with values “North
East”, “West”, “Middle West”, “South Center”, and “South
Atlantic”). Unlike the MEPS dataset, CS is a relatively small
dataset, but our experiments show that the diversity con-
straints and the balancing operations exhibit similar behavior.
For this dataset we ask for a ranking of the top CS depart-
ments, while ensuring that departments of different size and
location are well-represented.
5.2 Experimental Evidence of Imbalance
Using the in-group fairness measures defined in Section 3,
we now experimentally evaluate the extent to which in-group
fairness is violated in real datasets, as well as how well-
balanced it is across the different groups of candidates. Fig-
ures 1a and 1c exhibit the IGF-Ratio and IGF-Aggregated
Dataset k1 k2 k3 k4 k5diversity ratio agg diversity ratio agg diversity ratio agg diversity ratio agg diversity ratio agg
MEPS 28% 5% 3% 34% 7% 3% 34% 5% 1% 33% 3% 3% 28% 4% 5%
CS 20% 2% 9% 18% 1% 8% 17% 3% 9% 12% 1% 0% 11% 3% 1%
Table 2: Percentage of optimal utility lost due to diversity constraints and in-group fairness constraints in MEPS and CS datasets.
values, respectively, for each of the 8 race groups and 2 age
groups of the MEPS dataset, when a ranked list of the top-k
candidates is requested, for k P t20, 40, 60, 80, 100u. For ev-
ery prefix of the ranked list, diversity constraints ensure each
race and age is represented in that prefix in approximate cor-
respondence with their proportion in the input. For example,
at least 11 candidates among the top-20 are from the “Mid-
dle” age group, and at least 8 are from the “Young” age group.
In both Figures 1a and 1c, we observe that diversity con-
straints cause a significant amount of in-group unfairness
with respect to the two metrics, leading to values below 0.1
for some groups for both IGF-Ratio and IGF-Aggregated.
In particular, the young age group and the American Indian
race are the two groups with the lowest in-group fairness
values in both cases. Apart from low in-group fairness val-
ues, we also observe a significant amount of imbalance, since
some other groups actually receive very high in-group fair-
ness values for both measures.
At this point, it is worth providing some intuition regard-
ing why imbalance might arise to begin with. To help us with
this intuition we provide Figure 3a, which exhibits the distri-
bution of the scores for each group in MEPS (both race and
age). From this plot, we can deduce that the individuals in
the American Indian group tend to have lower scores com-
pared to other ethnic groups, and that the young age group
also has lower scores than the middle age group. However,
diversity constraints require that these groups are represented
in the output as well.
An important observation is that selecting a young Ameri-
can Indian in the outcome would satisfy two binding diversity
constraints, while using just one slot in the outcome. This es-
sentially “kills two birds with one stone”, compared to an al-
ternative solution that would dedicate a separate slot for each
minority. The slot that this solution “saves”, could then be
used for a high scoring candidate that is not part of a minor-
ity, leading to a higher utility. Therefore without any in-group
fairness constraints, the utility-maximizing solution is likely
to include a young American Indian who is neither one of
the top-scoring candidates in the young group, nor one of the
top-scoring American Indians, thus introducing in-group un-
fairness to both of these groups.
This undesired phenomenon — the selection of low-quality
candidates that satisfy multiple diversity constraints — is
more likely to impact low-scoring groups and may thus dis-
proportionately affect historically disadvantaged minorities,
or historically undervalued entities. We observe this in the CS
dataset, where small departments, and departments located in
South Center and South Atlantic areas, experience higher in-
group unfairness before our mitigation (see Figures 2a, 2c,
and 3b).
5.3 The Impact of Leximin Balancing
Having observed the imbalance that may arise in the output
of an unrestricted utility-maximizing algorithm, and having
explained how this may systematically adversely impact his-
torically disadvantaged groups, we now proceed to evaluate
the impact of the leximin solution. In all the Figures 1b, 1d,
2b, and 2d that are generated by the leximin solution, we see
a clear improvement compared to their counterparts, before
any balancing was introduced. Recall that the leximin solu-
tion’s highest priority is to maximize the minimum in-group
fairness over all groups, so looking, for instance, at Figure 1d
and comparing it with Figure 1c, it is easy to see that the
minimum IGF-Aggregated value has strictly increased for
every value of k. Note that this does not mean that every
group is better-off. For instance, the White group is signifi-
cantly worse-off in Figure 1d, especially for larger values of
k. However, this drop in the in-group fairness of the White
group enabled a very significant increase for the American
Indian group, and a noticeable increase for the Chinese and
young age groups, which suffered the most in-group unfair-
ness prior to the balancing operation. As a result, the in-group
fairness values after the leximin balancing operation are all
much more concentrated in the middle of the plot, instead of
resembling a bi-modal distribution of high and low in-group
fairness values as was the case before, in Figure 1c.
We observe very similar patterns in all the other applica-
tions of balancing as well, exhibiting a consistently better-
balanced in-group fairness across groups. Before we con-
clude, we also show that this significant improvement came
without a very significant loss in utility.
The Price of Balance Just like the enforcement of diver-
sity constraints leads to a drop in utility, the same is also true
when introducing the in-group fairness constraints in order
to reach a more balanced distribution. To get a better sense
of the magnitude of this loss in utility to achieve fairness, in
Table 2 we show the percentage loss caused by in-group fair-
ness and diversity constraints, measured against the optimal-
ity utility. Note that the k1, ..., k5 in the columns correspond
to r20, 40, 60, 80, 100s for MEPS and to r8, 10, 12, 14, 16s for
CS. Therefore, the entry in the first columns and first row
of this table should be interpreted as follows: for the MEPS
dataset and a ranking request with k “ 20, enforcing diver-
sity constraints leads to a loss of 28% in utility, compared to
the outcome without any such constraints. The entry to its
right (5%), is the additional loss in utility caused if, on top
of the diversity constraints, we also enforce the leximin con-
straints for the IGF-Ratio measure. Similarly, the next entry
to the right (3%) is the additional loss in utility caused if,
on top of the diversity constraints, we also enforce the lex-
imin constraints for the IGF-Aggregated measure. We note
that, compared to the 28% of utility loss required by diversity
constraints alone, the utility loss due to balancing in-group
fairness is actually quite small, and we observe this to be the
case for both datasets and all k values in our experiments.
As a final remark we note that, despite the fact that inte-
ger linear programs are not polynomial time solvable in gen-
eral, the computational cost involved in computing the utility-
maximizing outcome for a given vector of qv values was not
too significant, and the standard library solvers were quite ef-
ficient. Even for the most time-consuming case, which was
the IGF-Aggregated measure and the MEPS dataset, the
solver would complete in a matter of a few minutes.
6 Related Work
Yang and Stoyanovich were the first to consider fairness in
ranked outputs [Yang and Stoyanovich, 2017]. They focused
on a single binary sensitive attribute, such as male or female
gender, and minority or majority ethnic group. They then pro-
posed three fairness measures, each quantifying the relative
representation of protected group members at discrete points
in the ranking (e.g., top-10, top-20, etc.), and compounding
these proportions with a logarithmic discount, in the style of
information retrieval. A follow-up work [Zehlike et al., 2017]
developed a statistical test to ascertain whether group fairness
holds in a ranking, also with respect to a single binary sensi-
tive attribute, and proposed an algorithm that mitigates the
lack of group fairness. They further proposed the notions of
in-group monotonicity and ordering utility that are similar in
spirit to our in-group fairness. The imbalance in terms of in-
group fairness does not arise in the set-up of Zehlike et al.,
where only a single sensitive attribute is considered.
[Stoyanovich et al., 2018] considered online set selection
under label-representation constraints for a single sensitive
attribute, and posed the Diverse k-choice Secretary Problem:
pick k candidates, arriving in random order, to maximize util-
ity (sum of scores), subject to diversity constraints. These
constraints specify the lowest (`v) and highest (hv) number of
candidates from group v to be admitted into the final set. The
paper developed several set selection strategies and showed
that, if a difference in scores is expected between groups,
then these groups must be treated separately during process-
ing. Otherwise, a solution may be derived that meets the con-
straints, but that selects comparatively lower-scoring mem-
bers of a disadvantaged group — it lacks balance.
Trade-offs between different kinds of accuracy and fairness
objectives for determining risk scores are discussed in [Klein-
berg et al., 2017]. The authors use the term balance to refer
to performance of a method with respect to members of a par-
ticular class (positive or negative), and note that “the balance
conditions can be viewed as generalizations of the notions
that both groups should have equal false negative and false
positive rates.” Our use of the term “balance” is consistent
with their terminology, as it applies to in-group fairness.
The work of [Celis et al., 2018] conducts a theoretical in-
vestigation of ranking with diversity constraints of the kind
we consider here, for the general case of multiple sensitive at-
tributes. They prove that even the problem of deciding feasi-
bility of these constraints is NP-hard. They provide hardness
results, and develop exact and approximation algorithms for
the constrained ranking maximization problem, including a
linear program and a dynamic programming solution. These
algorithms also allow for the scores of the candidates to be
position-specific. The novelty of our work compared to that
of Celis et al. is that we focus on the imbalance in terms of
in-group fairness, develop methods for mitigating the imbal-
ance, and provide an empirical study of these methods.
Diversity, as a crucial aspect of quality of algorithmic
outcomes, has been studied extensively in Information Re-
trieval [Agrawal et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 2008] and content
recommendation [Kaminskas and Bridge, 2017; Vargas and
Castells, 2011]. See also [Drosou et al., 2017] for a recent
survey of diversity in set selection tasks, including also a con-
ceptual comparison of diversity and fairness, in the sense of
statistical parity.
7 Conclusion and Open Problems
In this paper we identified the lack of in-group fairness as
an undesired consequence of maximizing total utility subject
to diversity constraints, in the context of set selection and
ranking. We proposed two measures for evaluating in-group
fairness, and developed methods for balancing its loss across
groups. We then conducted a series of experiments to better
understand this issue and the extent to which our methods can
mitigate it. This paper opens up many interesting research di-
rections, both empirical and theoretical.
From an empirical standpoint, it would be important to de-
velop a deeper understanding of the aspects that may cause
disproportionate in-group unfairness. In our experimental
evaluation we observed that, all else being equal, a larger dif-
ference in expected scores between disjoint groups leads to
a higher imbalance in terms of in-group fairness. In the fu-
ture, we would like to identify additional such patterns that
may lead to systematic imbalance, especially when this may
disproportionately impact disadvantaged groups.
From a theoretical standpoint, it would be interesting to un-
derstand the extent to which polynomial time algorithms can
approximate the optimal utility or approximately satisfy the
combination of diversity and in-group fairness constraints. In
this paper we restricted our attention to finding exact solu-
tions to the defined optimization problems and, since even
simplified versions of these problems are NP-hard, we had to
resort to algorithms without any appealing worst-case guaran-
tees. In [Celis et al., 2018], the authors considered the design
of approximation algorithms for closely related problems in-
volving diversity constraints, but without any in-group fair-
ness constraints. On the other hand, [Celis et al., 2018] also
consider ranking problems where the candidates’ scores can
be position-dependent. Extending our framework to capture
these generalizations is another direction for future work.
Finally, moving beyond the leximin solution, one could
consider alternative ways to choose the in-group fairness vec-
tor q, such as maximizing the Nash social welfare, an ap-
proach that has recently received a lot of attention (e.g., [Cole
and Gkatzelis, 2018] and [Caragiannis et al., 2016]).
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